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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
case has established another limitation on the power of the courts to inter-
fere with the individual's choice between life and death-a limitation which
will undoubtedly be strictly and narrowly construed.
JEFFREY C. DANEK
ESCHEAT-PROPERTY SUBJECT TO E CHEAT-RIGHT TO ESCHEAT A DEBT
ACCORDED TO STATE OF CREDITOR'S LAST KNOWN ADDRESS.-In the recent
case of Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 85 Sup. Ct. 626 (1965), the United
States Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of whether the
right to escheat a debt should be accorded to the state having the most
"contacts" with the debt, the state of the debtor's incorporation, the state
where the debtor's principal offices were located, or the state of the creditor's
last known address.
In the case under discussion, the plaintiff, Texas, brought an action
against New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Sun Oil Company seeking an
injunction and declaration of rights for the purpose of determining which
state could acquire title to certain abandoned personal property through
escheat. The property in question consisted of various small debts' amount-
ing to about $26,000 which had accumulated on Sun's books over a period
of seven to forty years prior to the institution of this action. The debts
resulted from the failure of creditors to claim or cash checks and were
recorded on the books in Sun's two Texas offices.
The case was brought directly before the United States Supreme Court
under Art. III, § 2 of the United States Constitution which grants the Su-
preme Court original jurisdiction in cases "in which a state shall be a
party...." Previous suits had been brought by debtors who sought a declara-
tory judgment when certain property was escheated by a particular state
and they feared other states might later assert a right to escheat the same
property.2 But this was the first time that more than one state had been
made a party to the action.
Another state, Florida, was allowed to intervene when it asserted a
right to escheat that portion of the property owing to persons whose last
known address was in Florida.3 The Court assigned a master to hear the
case and to make appropriate reports. 4
1 Ely, Escheats: Perils & Precautions, 15 Bus. Law 791, 793-4 (1960), illustrates the
extent to which intangible personal property is today subject to escheat.
2 Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108 (1923); Anderson
National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 64 Sup. Ct. 599 (1943); Standard Oil Co. v. New
Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 71 Sup. Ct. 822 (1950).
3 373 U.S. 948, 83 Sup. Ct. 1677 (1962). Illinois, which claimed no property involved
in this case, also sought to intervene to urge that the right to escheat a debt should
depend upon the laws of the state in which the debt was located. Leave to intervene
was denied. 372 U.S. 926, 83 Sup. Ct. 1108 (1962).
4 372 U.S. 926, 83 Sup. Ct. 869 (1962).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
Historically, escheat first developed as an incident to feudal law,
whereby a fee reverted to the lord when a tenant died without leaving a
successor qualified to inherit under the original grant. The doctrine was
limited to real property and it was an incident of tenure which related
back to the right of the lord to take for want of a tenant. In this country
escheat in the feudal sense existed in only a few of the original colonies.
Since the revolution it has ceased to exist in the feudal sense and is now
largely regulated by statute. Escheat is an attribute of sovereignty and rests
on the principle of ultimate ownership by the state of all property within
its jurisdiction.
5
At common law, personal property was not subject to escheat, but the
doctrine of bona vacantia applied to abandoned personal property, and
gave the sovereign the right to appropriate. Today, however, the word
escheat has overcome its meaning under the English feudal system and
now includes personal property as well as land, and is regarded as an
incident of sovereignty not tenure.
7
A problem often arises as to the situs of intangible personal property.
Previous Supreme Court decisions have established that an escheat pro-
ceeding is an action in rem.8 Any state could claim that the situs of certain
intangible personal property was in its jurisdiction, thereby giving itself
the authority to adjudicate the rights to the property. Judge Cardozo, in
Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co.,9 stated the problem:
The situs of intangibles is in truth a legal fiction, but there
are times when justice or convenience requires that a legal situs be
ascribed to them. The locality ascribed to them is for some pur-
poses, the domicile of the creditor; for others, the domicile or
place of business of the debtor, the place, that is to say, where the
obligation was created or meant to be discharged; for others, any
place where the debtor can be found [cases omitted]. At the root
of the selection is generally a common sense appraisal of the re-
quirements of justice and convenience in particular conditions.
In the principal case, Texas claimed that it had the most "contacts"
with the debt, and therefore the debt should be considered as situated in
Texas. New Jersey claimed the same property on the basis of Sun's in-
corporation within her jurisdiction. Because the company's principal busi-
ness offices were located within her borders, Pennsylvania also claimed
that it had a right to escheat the property. Florida intervened claiming it
had a right to escheat that portion of the property owing to persons whose
last known address was in Florida.
5 30 C.J.S., Escheat § 1 (1942).
6 Vacant, unclaimed or stray goods were the property of the king.
7 In re Lindquist's Estate, 25 Cal. 2d 697, 154 P.2d 879 (1944).
S Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 64 Sup. Ct. 599 (1943); Standard
Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 71 Sup. Ct. 822 (1950).
9 255 N.Y. 120, 123, 174 N.E. 299, 300 (1931).
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The Court accepted Florida's contention and the master's recom-
mendation and held that since a debt is the property of the creditor and
not the debtor,' 0 in fairness, the property should escheat to the state of
the creditor's last known residence as shown by the debtor's books and
records." The Court further held that where there was no record of the
creditor's address, the property should escheat to the state of corporate
domicile, subject to the right of another state to escheat the property upon
proof that the creditor's last known address was within its borders. 12 In the
event that the state of creditor's last known address did not have laws provid-
ing for the escheat of intangible personal property, the state of corporate
domicile could again escheat, subject to recovery by the state of last known
address if and when the laws of that state were changed to provide for
escheat of intangible personal property.' 3 Following these rules, the state
of corporate domicile could cut off the claims of private persons only, i.e.,
the debtors and creditors; and such claims would remain subject to the
claims of other states upon proof of superior right thereto.
In rejecting the contention that the state with the most significant
"contacts"' 14 with the debt should be given jurisdiction over it,15 the Court
pointed out the problems that such a rule could cause. For example, the
"contacts" test would require determination of individual claims upon
their merits. In addition, litigation of conflicting claims would be encour-
aged by the rule and the cost of this litigation might, in the end, exceed the
amount sought to be recovered.
Pennsylvania contended that the state where the debtor maintained
his principal office or place of business should be allowed to escheat the
debt because the property had come into existence as a result of the eco-
nomic and legal benefits bestowed upon the debtor by the state. Although
impressed by this argument, the Court recognized its disadvantages and
rejected it.'6 Application of the rule proposed by Pennsylvania would raise
questions concerning the location of the debtor's principal office, and litiga-
tion by states with conflicting claims would be encouraged. Finally, per-
sonal property would be treated as an asset to the state when escheated,
although it had been a liability on the books of the debtor.
10 Florida was relying on a variation of the old concept of mobilia sequuntur
personam, according to which intangible personal property is found at the domicile of
its owner. See Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1927).
11 This solution is in accord with cases dealing with intangible personal property
in other areas of the law. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436
(1930); Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1929);
Blodgett v. Silberman, supra note 10.
12 379 U.S. 674, 679, 85 Sup. Ct. 626, 631 (1965).
13 Ibid.
14 Texas relied on numerous recent decisions in private litigation. E.g., Schmidt v.
Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155,
124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
15 379 U.S. 674, 677, 85 Sup. Ct. 626, 629 (1965).
16 Id. at 676, 85 Sup. Ct. at 630.
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
New Jersey's claim, that the property should escheat to the state of
incorporation, was also rejected.17 The Court stated that New Jersey's
proposal had obvious advantages in its ease of application, but it would
take unfair advantage of a relatively minor factor. Debts incurred through-
out the country would escheat to the state where the debtor happened to
incorporate.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, observed that the posi-
tion taken by the majority in the Texas case overruled several prior deci-
sions' 8 in which the Court had held that the state of the debtor's domicile
could escheat the intangible personal property when the creditor had
disappeared. It must be recognized, however, that this was the first time
a state had filed an original action in the Supreme Court naming all of
the other interested states. In the cases referred to by Justice Stewart, the
Court had reserved the questions concerning the rights of states not a party
to the proceedings in the property.19
The decision in the Texas case eliminates the complicated problem
of multiple escheat actions for intangible personal property. The only
issue for determination, the state of the creditor's last known address, will
be factual and not legal. Distribution of property will be governed by the
level of economic activity within a state and thus be fair and equitable.
The errors in distribution caused by creditors moving to states different
from those in which they lived at the time the obligation arose or the time
of escheat would tend to cancel each other out. It is interesting to note
that the result reached by the Court would parallel the result under the
Uniform Disposition of Property Act,20 if it had been adopted by the
several interested states.
17 Ibid.
18 Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108 (1923); Anderson
National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 64 Sup. Ct. 599 (1943); Standard Oil Co. v.
New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 71 Sup. Ct. 822 (1950).
19 Security Savings Bank v. California, supra note 19; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 68 Sup. Ct. 682 (1948).
20 Section 10 of the Uniform Act reads as follows:
RECIPROCITY FOR PROPERTY PRESUMED ABANDONED OR ESCHEATED
UNDER THE LAWS OF ANOTHER STATE.
If specific property which is subject to the provisions of sections 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, is
held for or owed or distributable to an owner whose last known address is in another
state by a holder who is subject to the jurisdiction of that specific state, the specific
property is not presumed abandoned in this state and is subject to this act if:
(a.) It may be claimed as abandoned or escheated under the laws of such other state;
and
(b.) The laws of such other state make provision that similar specific property
is not presumed abandoned or escheatable by such other state when held for or owed
or distributable to an owner whose last known address is within this state by a holder
who is subject to the jurisdiction of this state.
This act has been passed in at least seven states: Arizona, California, New Mexico,
Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. In addition, the states of Florida, Mississippi,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina are considering its passage.
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In the future, debtors such as Sun Oil, having on their books liabilities
to which they claim no interest, will be free to pay the amounts owed to
a state when escheated in a manner consistent with the Court's opinion
without fear of being subjected to double escheat. Only a factual question
need be determined and the costly litigation previously required to deter-
mine the merits of individual claims can be avoided.
PAUL C. KOMADA
LABOR LAW-USE OF LOCKOUT AND TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES BY MULTI-
EMPLOYER BARGAINING GROUP AFTER WHIPSAW STRIKE NOT UNFAIR LABOR
PRAcTIE.-In N.L.R.B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 85 Sup. Ct. 980 (1965), the
United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the use of the
lockout and the use of temporary employees by a multi-employer bargaining
group was an unfair labor practice. The Court held that the members of
the bargaining group could lawfully employ the lockout technique and hire
temporary employees to counteract the effect of a whipsaw strike against
them.
In the Brown case, respondents were members of a multi-employer bar-
gaining group which was comprised of six retail food stores in Carlsbad,
New Mexico. The stores had bargained unsuccessfully with the union for
a new contract. When the union struck Food Jet, one of the multi-employer
bargaining group, the other members of the group immediately locked out
all their union employees and informed them that all employees would be
recalled to work when the strike against Food Jet ended. All of the stores
involved remained open by using executive personnel and hiring temporary
replacements. Upon a complaint filed by the union, the National Labor
Relations Board found that the lockout, in conjunction with the hiring of
temporary replacements was an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) 1 of the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits coercive
and discriminatory conduct toward union employees. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that, in the absence of an unlawful intent, the
non-struck members of a multi-employer bargaining group may lock out
their employees and use temporary replacements to combat a whipsaw
1 Section 8(a) Provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer:
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 (see below) ...
(2) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. ...
Section 7 provides in part that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing and to engage in other connected activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
